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06 Mind model seems neessary for the
emergene of ommuniation
A. L®rinz
∗
& V. Gyenes & M. Kiszlinger & I. Szita
Abstrat
We onsider ommuniation when there is no agreement about symbols and mean-
ings. We treat it within the framework of reinforement learning. We apply dif-
ferent reinforement learning models in our studies and simplify the problem as
muh as possible. We show that the modelling of the other agent is insuient in
the simplest possible ase, unless the intentions an also be modelled. The model
of the agent and its intentions enable quik agreements about symbol-meaning
assoiation. We show that when both agents assume an `intention model' about
the other agent then the symbol-meaning assoiation proess an be spoiled and
symbol meaning assoiation may beome hard.
1 Introdution
The emergene of ommuniation is one of the most enigmati problems for
several disiplines inluding evolution, natural language theory, information
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1 Introdu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tehnology. For a reent olletion of papers, see, e.g., (1). For proper
treatment, the onept of ommuniation needs to be onsidered. First, let
us see a few examples.
Smoke signals. These are `few bit' signals that ould mean attention,
danger, help, and so on. The voabulary is is small, the ommuniation
speed is high, the ommuniation distane is large. The primary goal of
this ommuniation is to overome limited observation apabilities of other
agents, to warn, and to oordinate future ations.
Atomi interations. Not all light enabled interation is, however, om-
muniation: Atoms, for example, interat eah other by exhanging photons.
The emission and the absorption of photons are not intentional and the
transmitted photon has no hidden meaning.
Grooming. Aording to Dunbar, grooming between monkeys is used,
for example, to form allianes, serve, or apologize (3). Thus, we onsider
grooming ommuniation, although it is non-verbal ommuniation.
Then, the ommon features of ommuniation are as follows: (i) om-
muniation is optional, (ii) it is intentional, and (iii) ommuniated signals
are symbols of ertain meanings. Further, (iv) ommuniation is suessful,
if the meaning is the same for those who ommuniate. The emergene of
ommuniation is the subjet of evolutionary linguistis (for a reent review
on evolutionary linguistis, see (12)). Evolutionary linguistis fouses on the
seletive senario that might give rise to the appearane of early languages.
There are many theories and many possibilities. Let us onsider the popu-
lar and eient language game approah (13; 10; 9; 8). In language games,
the theoretial approah makes ertain assumptions. Presupposed onditions
inlude the following: agents interat and their interation is `oordinated'.
Thus, language game presupposes the existene of an agreement that agents
start to engage themselves in `oordinated ations'. Suh an agreement is also
a symbol-meaning assoiation. Thus, the language game approah assumes
existing symbol-meaning assoiation and builds on that assumption.
Our question onerns the very minimum of symbol-meaning assoiation
needed for suessful ommuniation. To this end, we make the problem as
simple as possible. Our analysis is embedded into the framework of reinfore-
ment learning. We study how ommuniation may depend on the presene
or the absene of the ommuniation of emotions or internal values. In our
simulations, ommuniation will emerge as a deliberate ation of the agents,
but only if ertain onditions are fullled.
The paper is organized as follows. We provide the theoretial analysis in
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Setion 2. This analysis shows the neessity of emotional oupling between
agents. We illustrate the analysis with simulations in simple senarios (Se-
tion 3). We shall disuss our results in Setion 4. We onlude in Setion 5.
The paper is understandable without involved mathematial tools. Mathe-
matial details are presented in the Appendies for the sake of ompleteness.
2 Theoretial analysis
In this setion, we investigate onditions when ommuniation between two
autonomous agents an emerge. The question is, how two autonomous agents
ould learn to ommuniate? We assume that neither the meanings nor the
ommuniation signals are xed in advane, there is no speial method of
negotiation, and there is no will for ommuniation. However, the possibility
for ommuniation is given, and the world is suh that ommuniation ould
be advantageous.
We investigate the problem in the framework of reinforement learning
(for an exellent introdution, see (11)). We investigate how ommuniation
may emerge from joint problem solving. That is, we ask how agents ould
learn when and what to ommuniate based on utility; how they ould learn
to emit and interpret signals provided that both parties benet from those.
It is surprising that if ommuniation has a ost, then it is still not suient
that
• the possibility of ommuniation is given and
• ommuniation would be beneial for both agents (even with osts).
The underlying reason is that we have assumed that none of the agents
has xed an interpretation of the signals, therefore they have to learn simul-
taneously the translation from meanings to signals and vie versa. Let us all
one of the agents, that wishes to ommuniate something the `speaker', and
the other one, whih should learn to interpret it, the `listener'. Now onsider
the ase, when both agents are in the learning phase, and the speaker exper-
iments with dierent signals to express dierent meanings. The listener may
not be able to dierentiate the meanings, and beause of the osts, stops
listening (i.e. learns that it is not worth to ommuniate). This eet ap-
pears already in the simplest possible ase. In this ase, behaviors an be
omputed analytially.
2 Theoretial analysis 4
Consider two agents, A and B. For the sake of simpliity, we assume that
ommuniation is one-diretional: A may speak and B may listen to it. In
eah episode, agent A may either be in state "1" or "2" (with equal probabil-
ity), and has three possible ations: ommuniate "X", ommuniate "Y",
and do not ommuniate. Communiation has a ost of 1 > cA ≥ 0. Agent
B may listen to the signal of A for a ost of 1 > cB ≥ 0, and has to guess the
state of A (say "1" or "2"). They both reeive a reward of +1, if the guess
is orret and a penalty of −1 if not. Sine the ost of ommuniation is
less than the reward obtainable by it, ommuniation is desirable, if the two
agents are able to agree that saying "X" means one of the states and saying
"Y" means the other.
The poliy of A an be desribed by the triple MA = (α, p1, p2), where α
is the probability that A will ommuniate something, p1 is the probability
that A says "X" in state "1", 1−p1 is the probability that A says "Y" in state
"1" given that he deides to ommuniate, and p2 is the probability that A
says "X" in state "2", 1− p2 is the probability that A says "Y" in state "2"
given that he is ommuniating. Similarly, the poliy of B an be desribed
by the triple MB = (β, qX , qY ), where β is the probability that B will listen
to the signal, qX is the probability that B guesses "1" after hearing "X",
1− qX is the probability that B guesses "2" after hearing "X" given that he
listens, and qY is the probability that B guesses "1" after hearing "Y", 1−qY
is the probability that B guesses "2" after hearing "Y" given that he listens.
The probabilities and rewards for the ase when A talks and B listens are
summarized in Figure 1. If B does not listen, or A does not talk, then B
guesses "1" with probability 0.5.
It is easy to alulate, that if both of them ommuniate, the ommon
part of their expeted reward is (p1 − p2)(qX − qY ), and 0 if any of them is
not ommuniating. Thus, the expeted reward for poliies MA and MB is
RA(MA,MB) = α · (−cA) + 2αβ(p1 − p2)(qX − qY )
for agent A and
RB(MA,MB) = β · (−cB) + 2αβ(p1 − p2)(qX − qY ).
for agent B. We have assumed that neither A nor B an bind meanings to
signals, so initially p1 ≃ p2 and qX ≃ qY . Let us investigate the learning
proess of agent A. If |qX − qY | < ε (B annot distinguish well between
meanings), the ost term of A will be greater than his reward term, so (i)
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Fig. 1: Various outomes and assoiated rewards
he annot tune p1 and p2 reliably (their gradient is small), and (ii) he an
minimize his losses by lowering α. The exat value of ε depends on the ost
of ommuniation. Similarly, B will try to minimize β until A does not learn
to distinguish between onepts, and annot reliably tune qX and qY .
As a result, during early trials, p1, p2, qX and qY an only hange stohas-
tially, by random walk. As the ost of ommuniation grows, so does ε, and
the time needed to exeed this limit by random walk grows exponentially.
However, during this time, α and β keep diminishing. So by the time A and
B ould (by hane) break the symmetry, and learn the distintion of mean-
ings, they will learn that ommuniation is not useful. We note that in the
general ase, knowing the other agent's dynamis (the parameter sets (p1,
p2, α) and (qX , qY , β)) does not always help; e.g., if the reward of one agent
is not available to the other agent and vie versa, or, if the rewards of the
agents do not depend on eah other's behaviors. In our two-state example
behaviors are oupled. Then, in theory, agents ould use ertain methods
to estimate the hidden reward funtion of the other agent. For example,
non-diret impliit estimation is aomplished by the general poliy gradient
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method: this method  up to some extent  overomes partial observations.
It is so, beause individual trajetories are onsidered in this ase. Suessful
estimation is, however, highly improbable in sophistiated real life situations.
Main hypothesis
Within the framework of reinforement learning, we have a single means to
ure the aw desribed previously; the agents should be able to model eah
other's intentions; the dynamis and the `goals' of the other agent. This is
possible if the values RA and/or RB are made available to them.
Now, the situation beomes dierent: agent A an optimize MA for a
xed MB. Although agent A annot modify the poliy of B, he an model,
what would be rewarding for agent B. Furthermore, he onsiders the optimal
ombination of the MA and MB strategies. Let us see the possible senarios:
1-step modelling
Optimizing MA for a xed MB means alulating the onditional strategy
MA|B(MB) = argmax
MA
RA(MA,MB),
that is, A an alulate, that if B followed MB, what would be the optimal
hoie for himself, i.e., for A.
2-step modelling
If agent A `knows' that he is using the onditional 1-step modelling strategy
about agent B, then he might as well suppose that B does the same, i.e.,
agent A might suppose that the strategy of agent B is the following:
MB|A(MA) = argmax
MB
RB(MA,MB),
Now, agent A an simply hoose his optimal strategy:
M∗A = argmax
MA
RA(MA,MB|A(MA)).
It might be worth noting that this abstrat problem phrasing goes beyond
the problem of ommuniation; it is a general learning problem. If an agent
does something and it is visible to the other agent then it is a signal, whih
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is dependent on the state of the rst agent. If both agents are learning, then
the situation beomes similar to our simplied example on ommuniation.
Now, we introdue the basi onepts of reinforement learning. Then we
turn to the illustrative numerial experiments.
2.1 Basi onepts of reinforement learning
Reinforement learning aims to solve behavior optimization based on imme-
diate rewards. The main goal of optimization is to maximize the long-term
disounted and umulated reward, the value, or return during the deision
making proess. Reinforement learning problems may be solved by value
funtion estimation or by diret strategy (poliy) searh methods. In value
funtion estimation, states or state-ation pairs are assigned value estimates
that reet the expeted value of the long term umulated and possibly dis-
ounted reward of hoosing them. The agent is not greedy and may not
hoose the optimal immediate reward, but it tries to at greedily aording
to this value funtion: he selets the next state or ation, whih promises the
optimal long-term (disounted and) umulated reward also alled return.
It is known that in partially observed environment, like in our ase when
the internal states of the agents may not be observed, the diret poliy searh
method an be more eient (2). In this ase, the poliy of the agent is
expliitly represented in a parameterized form, and the parameters are up-
dated so that the desribed poliy beomes optimal from the point of view of
the return. Poliy gradient methods maximize the expeted return by using
gradient methods. The gradient of the return funtion an be alulated ex-
pliitly if the return funtion is known (see Appendix A). However, general
methods also exist for ases when the reward funtion is not known expliitly
(Appendix B).
Here, we shall present numerial results for these methods. Note that in
our simplied problem the immediate reward and the long-term reward are
idential. More sophistiated situations show the same phenomena (4).
3 Computer experiments
We have tested our theoretial analysis by onduting numerial experiments.
We used poliy gradient methods, and various methods where the agents
modelled eah other. We studied the following ases:
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Method 1: The agents did not model eah other. In this ase we studied
value based methods and expliit poliy gradient method. We present
results for expliit poliy gradient method.
Method 2: The agents did not model eah other diretly, but use the general
poliy gradient method. This method models the world and thus the
other agent impliitly.
Method 3: Agent A estimated agent B's dynamis, i.e. the parameters that
determine B's poliy. In this ase, agent A used a 1-step model of agent
B. Thus, in this model, agent A senses the rewards of agent B and
hooses the optimal poliy aordingly. Agent B did not model agent
A and applied the poliy gradient method
Method 4: Both agent A and agent B had aess to the rewards of the other
agent and estimated eah other's dynamis. Both agents used a 1-step
model of eah other to hoose their optimal poliy
Method 5: Both agent A and B had aess to the rewards of the other agent
and estimated eah other's dynamis. Agent A used a 2-step model of
B, agent B used a 1-step model of A to hoose an optimal poliy
Method 6: Both agent A and B had aess to the rewards of the other agent
and estimated eah other's dynamis, and used a 2-step model of eah
other to hoose their optimal poliy
In the experiments, the values α and β were initialized to 0.75 in all ases.
This hoie enables us to ompare the dierent methods. The values are
high enough to give a fair amount of hane for the agents at the beginning
to utilize ommuniation. The values p1, p2, qX , qY were initialized randomly
aording to the uniform distribution in the range [0.4, 0.6].
In the omputational studies we averaged 1000 runs. In eah run we
had at most 1000 learning episodes. In eah episode an ation was made
by agent A and a reation, i.e., a guess, was made by agent B. Learning
was onsidered suessful if after a ertain number of steps, trials were 100%
suessful; the reward in eah of the next 100 trials was +1. The number of
steps needed for suessful ommuniation (not inluding the 100 suessful
ones that are used for measuring suess rate) is the time needed for the
agreement. Figure 2 depits the suess rate for the dierent methods.
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Fig. 2: Performane of the various methods as a funtion of the ost of
ommuniation. Shorthand "vs": versus. For example, 2-step vs 1-step: one
agent used a 1-step model, the other agent used a 2-step model.
The general poliy gradient method (Appendix B) is superior to the ex-
pliit poliy gradient method (Appendix A), however, if eah agents uses
these methods then they will not learn to ommuniate if ommuniation
ost is high. Value estimation based reinforement learning methods seem to
be the weakest amongst all methods that we studied (results are not shown
here). Methods where agents use 1-step or 2-step models are sometimes 100%
suessful, with a single notable exeption: if both agents use 2-step mod-
els then suess rate is only about 50%. When rewards of the other agents
are available then value estimation based method (the SARSA method (6))
sueeds, too.
It an be seen, that when agents do not model eah other, the hane that
they learn to ommuniate dereases as the ost of ommuniation inreases.
However, when agents model eah other, they are able to learn that om-
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muniation is useful even when the ost is high, with the peuliar exeption
when both agents use 2-step models.
Figure 3 depits the time needed to reah an agreement. Situations when
agreement was not reahed are exluded from these statistis. It an also be
Fig. 3: Learning time for various methods as a funtion of the ost of om-
muniation. Averages inlude only suessful learning ases. Shorthand gen:
general, pol: poliy, grad: gradient
seen, that when both agents an model the rewards of the other agent, then
agreement about the signal-meaning assoiation is fast. This is so, beause
they shortut the slow tuning proedure of reinforement learning. If this
shortut is not applied, like in the ase of the value estimation based SARSA
method, agreement an be still reahed, but only very slowly. When one of
the agents thinks two steps ahead, agreement is even faster. In this ase,
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agreement is aomplished in 1 step after an initial transient of 10 steps
when the agents estimate eah others' parameters. When both agents try to
think two steps ahead and agreement is only ahieved in 50% of the ases,
agreement  if it ours  is very fast. Thus, if agreement is not reahed
quikly, then agents ould suspet that the seond-order intentional model
(e.g., one agent assumes that the other agent uses a 1-step model) is not
valid.
4 Disussion
Theory of reinforement learning shows that globally optimal solutions an
be learned `easily' under strit onditions. The relevant ondition for us is
the Markov ondition: information from the past does not help in improving
deisions. In other words, every information is enoded into the atual state
of the agent and all state variables are amenable to the agent for ating and
learning. If this ondition together with some other tehnial assumptions
are fullled, then the learning task is alled Markov deision problem (MDP,
see, e.g., (11) and the referenes therein).
The Markov ondition is hardly met in real life. It is not met in our ase
either, beause the parameters of deision making of agent A (or B) (i) are
subjet to experienes of agent A (or B), i.e., they depend on the history, (ii)
these parameters are not available for agent B (or A), and (iii) agent B (or
A) would benet from knowing these parameters. In this ase the world is
only partially observed and task is alled partially observed Markov deision
problem (POMDP) (see, e.g., (5) and referenes therein).
This lak of information an be eased by modelling the other agent. The
other agent might have many variables and a large subset of those variables
an be modelled by dierent means. We demonstrated this by using poliy
gradient methods. Both the expliit poliy gradient and the general pol-
iy gradient method develop models of the `private' parameters of the other
agent: they model the state-ation mapping, that is, the poliy of the other
agent. The modelling proess an be expliit: a partiular model is assumed
in this ase, or impliit, when there is a general parametrization in the poliy
gradient. Our simulations demonstrate that the performane of the expliit
poliy gradient model is inferior to that of the general model. This obser-
vation an be traed bak to the dierenes between the methods: general
poliy gradient makes diret use of the immediate rewards, deals with indi-
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vidual state-ation sequenes separately. Thus, the general poliy gradient
method  up to some extent and indiretly  takes into aount the intentions
of the other agent. In the ase of the model based expliit poliy gradient
method this onnetion is highly remote: the same information enters the
omputation only after expeted value omputation. Value estimation based
methods (not shown here) have the same drawbak and they are also infe-
rior to the general poliy gradient method. These notes onern our simple
senario that does not fulll the onditions of MDPs.
We have shown that the lak of a single quantity, the reward, makes a
huge dierene: not having aess to the reward of the other agent, the emer-
gene of ommuniation an be seriously limited if ommuniation involves
ost. The assumption that ommuniation is ostly seems realisti, beause
ommuniation takes time. Without aess to the rewards of the other agent,
the higher the ost, the sooner the agents learn that ommuniation is useless.
There are several exeptions to this simple observation. For example, if
the poliy of one of the agents is steady (i.e., this agent is not learning),
then this agent will at eetively as the teaher and the adaptive agent an
learn either the appropriate signal (if he is the speaker) or the appropriate
meaning (if he is the listener).
The problem arises if the learning rates of the two agents are about the
same. Then, to develop a suessful ommuniation, they should be able to
sense and then model (impliitly or expliitly) the immediate rewards, or the
umulated rewards of the other agent. We shall all this apability emotional
intelligene. It is satisfatory if one of the agents has that apability. If
an agent has emotional intelligene then the learning of symbol-meaning
assoiation may beome very eient.
There are many ways to make this learning eient, depending on what
the agents assume about their partner. Consider, for example, that both
agents have emotional intelligene and both agents use this emotional intelli-
gene when they learn to ommuniate. Now, it makes a huge dierene how
they use the emotional information they have. For example, indiret mod-
elling of the situation ours if we assume that the agents reeive the same
reward. Then we are in the MDP domain and we an apply MDP methods
suh as SARSA (6))  without diretly modelling the other agent  safely.
A large improvement was gained if both agents onsidered what is the
best to them. Further, if (only) one of the agents used that information
to `antiipate' what the other agent might prefer to do in the next step, in
reation to his ation, then learning beame even faster  as it was expeted
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from theory (Setion 2).
However, learning is severely spoiled if both agents are lever enough
and antiipate the next step of the other agents. This has the following
explanation: both agents suppose that the other is using a 1-step model
to model him, whih, in this ase, is false, beause both agents use 2-step
models. In this situation, in 50% of the ases the randomly generated initial
parameters allow to reah an agreement just by hane. In the other 50% no
agreement is reahed.
As we have noted earlier, in this peuliar ase the agents ould suspet
that the 1-step model they use about the other agent is false: the other
agent also onsiders `what is on his partner's mind'. Suh onsideration
are the starting points of game theory. However, the situation here an be
dierent from game theory. In priniple, our agents an expet very fast
agreement and they an beome frustrated beause of the lak of this quik
agreement. Our agents are also emotionally intelligent and they might sense
the frustration of the other agent. That is, our agents might note that their
models are not valid and might ome to a joint agreement. Thus, in our ase,
agents may use higher-order intentional models and they will sueed.
An advantage of our formulation is that the agent might deide if he
wants to optimize the sum of the two rewards (ooperative agent), his own
reward (selsh agent), the reward of the other agent no matter how muh it
osts (altruisti agent), might deide to hange this hoie, and so on. These
situations all for further investigations.
In our simple example, the immediate reward and the long-term reward
were idential. Situations, where these two quantities are dierent have also
been studied (4). The observations are about the same as in the simple ase
that we presented here.
5 Conlusions
We have used expliit and impliit models in reinforement learning. The
world was partially observed, but otherwise it was simplied as muh as pos-
sible: we used two agents, two ations and two signals. We have shown that
emotional intelligene is neessary for the emergene of ommuniations even
in this simplest possible ase. Numerial simulations demonstrate that if the
rewards of the other agent are available for modelling, then signal-meaning
assoiations an be learned quikly. The order of intentionality agents sup-
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pose in their models about the other agent may give rise to problems, but
the mere fat of the disagreement indiates that the models ould be invalid.
Novel situations may arise: agents might deide about their attitude towards
other agents.
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6 Appendies: Algorithms and pseudo odes
A Expliit poliy gradient method
In this ase the expliit reward funtions are available for the two agents and
they an alulate the gradients of the parameter sets MA = (α, p1, p2) and
MB = (β, qX , qY ):
RA(MA,MB) = α · (−cA) + 2αβ(p1 − p2)(qX − qY )
for agent A and
RB(MA,MB) = β · (−cB) + 2αβ(p1 − p2)(qX − qY ).
for agent B. As an be seen from the equations, eah agent also needs to
estimate the parameters of the other agent in order to alulate its own
expeted reward.
B General poliy gradient method
Let our poliy pi depend on the parameters summarized in a vetor θ ∈ Rk.
Let X be the set of all possible trajetories in the task, and let r(X) denote
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the reward olleted in an episode. Then η(θ), the value of the poliy pi(θ),
is the expeted value of the reward:
η(θ) = E [r(X)] =
∑
x
r(x)q(θ, x)
where E [.], denotes the expetation operator, x ∈ X denotes a trajetory,
r(x) denotes the reward olleted while traversing trajetory x and q(θ, x) is
the probability of traversing trajetory x having parameters θ. The gradient
of η(θ) with respet to θ is:
∇η(θ) =
∑
x
r(x)∇q(θ, x) =
∑
x
r(x)
∇q(θ, x)
q(θ, x)
q(θ, x) = E
[
r(X)
∇q(θ,X)
q(θ,X)
]
A sequene of trajetories x1, x2, . . . , xn give an unbiased estimate of ∇η(θ):
∇ˆη(θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
r(xi)
∇q(θ, xi)
q(θ, xi)
Beause of the law of large numbers:
ˆ∇η(θ) → ∇η(θ) with probability 1.
The quantity
∇q(θ,x)
q(θ,x)
is alled likelihood ratio or sore funtion.
Let the trajetory x be a sequene of states x1, x2, . . . , xT , and let
pxtxt+1(θ) be the probability of moving from state xt to xt+1 having parame-
ters θ. Then:
∇q(θ, x)
q(θ, x)
=
T−1∑
t=0
∇pxtxt+1(θ)
pxtxt+1(θ)
,
whih an be derived the following way:
q(θ, x) =
T−1∏
t=0
pxtxt+1
⇒ log q(θ, x) = log
T−1∏
t=0
pxtxt+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
log pxtxt+1
⇒ ∇ log q(θ, x) =
T−1∑
t=0
∇ log pxtxt+1 =
T−1∑
t=0
∇pxtxt+1
pxtxt+1
,
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sine ∇ log f(x) = ∇f(x)
f(x)
. This sum an also be aumulated iteratively.
In our ase the algorithm is simplied, sine eah episode onsists of
one step (agent A says something and agent B replies). Furthermore, we
update the parameters after eah episode, whih means N = 1 in the above
algorithm. This way the two yles boil down to one line of update after
eah episode:
θ ← θ + r
∇ps,a(θ)
ps,a(θ)
.
The respetive gradients and probabilities an be alulated from the param-
eters α, p1, p2, β, qX , qY :
In the tables the state or ation denoted by ∅ means ommuniating
nothing.
C 1-step modelling
In this ase the agent alulates a onditional strategy that optimizes MA
and MB jointly, as disussed in the text. Reall, that by joint optimization
we mean that we an alulate the onditional strategy
MA|B(MB) = argmax
MA
RA(MA,MB),
that is, A an alulate, that if B followed MB, what would the optimal
hoie of A be. A an estimate the parameters of B and thus an estimate his
poliy,MB = (β, qX , qY ). The same is true vie versa, for agent B estimating
the poliy of A, MA = (α, p1, p2). The parameters an be estimated by the
agents observing eah other's behavior, and approximating the parameters
with their relative frequenies, that is, the ratio of the ourrene frequenies
of ertain ations:
Then MA|B(MB) an be derived analytially, and is the following:
• if B's will to use ommuniation (βˆ) is so low that it is not worth using
ommuniation for A beause of his own ost, then do not ommuniate
anything,
• otherwise, if A is in state 1, and B is more likely to answer 1 to X than
to Y (qˆX > qˆY ), or if A is in state 2 and B is more likely to answer 2
to X that to Y (qˆX < qˆY ), then say X ,
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• otherwise say Y
The onditional poliy of agent B,MB|A(MA), is essentially the same, but
using the estimated parameters of A (αˆ, pˆ1, pˆ2).
D 2-step modelling
Supposing that B uses 1-step modelling, A an think one step further. Based
on that, he an simply hoose his optimal strategy:
M∗A = argmax
MA
RA(MA,MB|A(MA)).
This optimal poliy an also be derived analytially, and is the following:
• if B's will to use ommuniation (βˆ) is so low that it is not worth
using ommuniation for A beause of his own ost, or A's will to use
ommuniation (αˆ) is so low that it is not worth using ommuniation
for B beause of his own ost, then do not ommuniate anything,
• otherwise, if A is in state 1, and pˆ1 > pˆ2 (or if A is in state 2 and
pˆ1 < pˆ2), then suppose that B traes this, and answers 1 (2) if A says
X , so say X ,
• otherwise say Y
Again, the optimal poliy for agent B is essentially the same, using the
other's parameters.
E SARSA
The SARSA algorithm builds a table and omputes the value of eah entries.
For the desription of the algorithm, see, e.g., (6; 7) and referenes therein.
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ε = 0.05, r, p ∈ [0, 1]
for eah test
α, β = 0.75, initialize p1, p2, qx, qy to random values
for eah episode i = 1, ..., MAX_EPISODES do
Agent A
update the approximation of the parameters of B: βˆ, qˆx, qˆy
update own parameters by gradient:
∆α = −cA + βˆ(r + p) + βˆ(p1 − p2)(qˆX − qˆY )(r − p)
∆p1 = αβˆ(qˆX − qˆY )(r − p)
∆p2 = −αβˆ(qˆX − qˆY )(r − p)
α← α + ε∆α
p1 ← p1 + ε∆p1
p2 ← p2 + ε∆p2
Agent B
update the approximation of the parameters of A: αˆ, pˆ1, pˆ2
update own parameters by gradient:
∆beta = −cB + αˆ(r + p) + αˆ(pˆ1 − pˆ2)(qX − qY )(r − p)
∆qx = αˆβ(pˆ1 − pˆ2)(r − p)
∆qy = −αˆβ(pˆ1 − pˆ2)(r − p)
β ← β + ε∆β
qx ← qx + ε∆qx
qy ← qy + ε∆qy
end for
end for
Tab. 1: Pseudo-ode of the expliit poliy gradient method
E SARSA 19
z0 = 0 ∈ R
k,∆0 = 0 ∈ R
k
for eah episode j = 1, ..., N do
R0 = 0 ∈ R
for eah state transition xt → xt+1 do
zt+1 = zt +
∇pXtXt+1(θ)
pXtXt+1(θ)
Rt+1 = Rt +
1
t+1
(rt − Rt)
end for
∆j+1 = ∆j +Rtzt
end for
θ ← θ + ∆N
N
Tab. 2: Pseudo-ode for the general poliy gradient method
Tab. 3: Gradients and probabilities for agent A
state ation ∇α ∇p1 ∇p2 probability
1 X p1 α 0 αp1
1 Y 1− p1 −α 0 α(1− p1)
2 X p2 0 α αp2
2 Y 1− p2 0 −α α(1− p2)
* ∅ -1 0 0 (1− α)
Tab. 4: Gradients and probabilities for agent B
state ation ∇β ∇qX ∇qY probability
X 1 qX β 0 βqX
X 2 1− qX −β 0 β(1− qX)
Y 1 qY 0 β βqY
Y 2 1− qY 0 −β β(1− qY )
* ∅ -1 0 0 (1− β)
∅ 1 / 2 0.5 0 0 β
∅ ∅ -0.5 0 0 (1− β)
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αˆ = # episodes where A had hosen to ommuniate
# all episodes so far
pˆ1 =
# episodes where A said "X" in state "1"
# all episodes so far where A had hosen to ommuniate
pˆ2 =
# episodes where A said "X" in state "2"
# all episodes so far where A had hosen to ommuniate
βˆ = # episodes where B had hosen to listen
# all episodes so far
qˆX =
# episodes where B guessed "1" after hearing "X"
# all episodes so far where B had hosen to listen
qˆY =
# episodes where B guessed "1" after hearing "Y"
# all episodes so far where B had hosen to listen
Tab. 5: Estimating parameters
if 2βˆ < cA
do not ommuniate
otherwise
if (A is in state 1 and qˆX > qˆY ) or (A is in state 2 and qˆX < qˆY )
say X
otherwise
say Y
end if
end if
Tab. 6: Pseudo-ode of the 1-step modelling method for agent A
if 2βˆ < cA or 2αˆ < cB
do not ommuniate
otherwise
if (A is in state 1 and pˆ1 > pˆ2) or (A is in state 2 and pˆ1 < pˆ2)
say X
otherwise
say Y
end if
end if
Tab. 7: Pseudo-ode of the 2-step modelling method for agent A
E SARSA 21
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